The post “Modi, Trump and Decoding Indo-US Equations” discussed the contours of the equations between India and US over time and the challenges and opportunities ahead. There is a thought-provoking piece by Mr. Rajeev Srinivasa that appeared in Swarajya dt. Feb 23, 2019 (https://t.co/40051JV9vQ?amp=1 ). The piece speculates that in the absence of trade deal, the point of interest in Trump visiting India might be Afghanistan. While there are no second thoughts on Afghanistan featuring in the talks between PM Modi and President Trump, it perhaps might be moot to wonder whether it would be the central theme. An analysis of the conclusions reached by the article is worth exploring.
To the author, Trump had to highlight something from the visit and to many it would have been the trade deal. Yet Trump himself has ruled out the trade deal suggesting he is saving it for the later day. The Indian community in US is generally pro-Democrat, small in number but definitely very vocal. While their voting patterns might be too small to influence the results, yet their vocal influence has potentiality to tilt the elections. Bernie Sanders, the Democrat frontrunner is known to be anti-India, thus Indian voting behaviour might witness a shift to Trump if he makes the right noises. There is no doubt, there are traces of following the path of the Jewish lobby, small in magnitude but highly vocal in influence. Nonetheless, given the remarkable success of ‘Howdy Modi’, Trump need not have to come to India all the way to woo the Indian voter back home.
Further, the author suggests the rise of the Quad etc. might not be of such pressing immediate importance for a standalone long tour to India in an election year. There are no signs yet of a possible Trump cakewalk in the forthcoming November elections. President Tump obviously desires something if he is to embark on a mere 36 hour visit that needs an almost 30 air travel both ways combined. Given his transactional nature, there is something more than optics that is at work.
The author therefore hypothesizes Trump’s visit might be linked to Afghan deal. As Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced recently, a peace deal is about to be signed with the Taliban on Feb 29, just after President Trump reaches home after his India visit. A peace deal with Taliban allowing Trump to proclaim victory, withdraw US troops by early autumn, increasing his chances of winning a re-election. Afghanistan is perhaps the longest battle the US has engaged itself in, drawn into a stalemate, and need some formula to excruciate from the predicament it has found itself in.
A peace deal will strengthen Taliban, perhaps capture power in Kabul, allowing Pakistan the strategic depth it desperately needs. Moreover, it allows China a space to work in the Central Asian belt given the mineral resources that Afghanistan possesses. India’s gain in Afghanistan in the last two decades is likely to wither away. Post-Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan backed forces captured power in Kabul leading to ultimate Taliban victory. India stood in near helpless situation. Moreover, the jihadis from Afghanistan moved in large numbers to Kashmir aggravating the troubles there. Therefore some increase in troubles in Kashmir is all to be expected. Hence options before India are limited if it has to avoid the troubles it found itself in nearly three decades ago.
It is common knowledge that US has been pressing India to deploy its troops in Afghanistan and take over the role of the net security provider in the region allowing US to withdraw. Having boots on the ground would obviously be radical shift in India’s security strategy and need an execution of political will of the highest magnitude. India has resisted the US pressures so far. In recent months, Afghanistan too has been coaxing India to deploy boots on the ground. India might be keen to enhance the soft power, provide training to Afghan troops, yet deploying boots is another matter altogether. The geography adverse in many aspects in terms of supply chain and logistics and no land connection is deterrent. Moreover IPKF and Sri Lanka hangover is something India has not yet recovered from. The solution the author seems to suggest is linking Indian deployment of troops in Afghanistan to resolution of Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) issue. India might consider troop deployment if there was direct land corridor between Indian and Afghanistan something the Indian recapture of PoJK would achieve.
The question revolves around the practicality and rationality of the offer as bargaining chip in negotiations between Trump and Modi. US no doubt wants a decent exit from Afghanistan and therefore there would be lot of spin over the positive dimensions of the forthcoming peace deal. US is of course wary of China and its increasing presence in Afghanistan. India if has to realise its ambitions of global superpower, must be ready to take over the provision of global public goods at least in the sphere of its influence. India has to shed its pretensions and hesitations if it wants to scale up its ambitions. Afghanistan is a strategic territory for India and cannot afford to see the gains disappear yet again. Besides, India simply cannot afford letting Pakistan and thus China gain a strategic depth on a platter.
Yet the geography cannot be glossed over. There is no direct land or sea corridor connecting India to Afghanistan at present. Pakistan is hostile and would not countenance India’s presence in its backyard. In an eventual war, Pakistan might have to face a two front war. Iran too would not be worth trusting in the event of things going wrong. Therefore Indian troops would be caught in quagmire and any retreat would entail severe humiliation and boosting of Pakistani strength. One way would be involvement under UN umbrella. Yet operating under blue helmets might have its own limitations.
The ostensible answer would be seeking to capture PoJK to create the direct land corridor linking Kashmir to Wakhan Corridor via Gilgit. There has been lot of talk on recapture of PoJK in recent times. Discussion on converting de facto border in J&K to de jure border seems passé. The apparent question is the timing of operation to recapture. In the context, India would obviously be sounding out the West for their probable reactions. One suspects Modi Xi talks in Wuhan and Mahabalipuram were in some ways linked to gauging Chinese reactions to a possible Indian attempt to invade and recapture PoJK.
China is currently at its weakest point and pre-occupied with aftereffects of Coronavirus pandemic. Pakistan is struggling economically. Pakistan capture of Kabul will strengthen it and make India’s task difficult. As Taliban seeks to advance to Kabul and beyond, there is no doubt certain measures India has to take to make Pakistani advances difficult on its Western border. Nothing more would make it more difficult than India’s advances into PoJK. India needs US support at least to prevent Chinese diplomatic moves in the UN. The time window that India might have to achieve its strategic objectives might be very limited but nothing comes free in the global power games. Therefore, it would rational and in fact the expected response from India in its dealings with Trump administration on Afghanistan.
It would be unsurprising if India doesn’t place the above offer in some form in its negotiations with Trump. Obviously, they would be off record and if a deal were to be reached, would be secret deal something that we might come to know only decades later. There is definitely merit in the author’s expectations. US might play hardball and the deal might be a nonstarter. Yet if India can get some US President to agree to the deal, it would be President Trump. Given his large ego, the massive rallies in Houston and now in Ahmedabad might be a good way to keep him in good humour. The defence deals would perhaps be sweeteners to an US President eager to secure contracts for US firms.
Yet analysing through the economic prism of rational entity, India would be building a bargain with US on Afghan issue linking to PoJK. The manner and form would perhaps be different as we conventionally anticipate but there might be some directional pointers towards the same. Given the context, it might not be prudent to rule out Afghan angle to the Trump visit. Rather, it would be far-sighted to link the Trump visit to Afghan deal. If this were to be true, India must be unapologetic with its interests. At the heart of any country’s strategic directions is a clarity in terms of its interests and the mechanisms to achieve the same. Therefore examining the context of rational outcomes, India playing hardball cannot be ruled out.
Thoughts on Theory and Practice 