In his book Accidental India (2012, Aleph Books), Shankar Aiyyar narrates an interesting story that happened at the Delhi Airport in July 1964. An agricultural scientist Dr. Guduru Chellam Rao was returning from Christchurch via Manila after attending a conference and visiting International Rice Research Institute. He was in a way on the verge of creating a beginning of history albeit unknowingly. If there was a path dependence, this was one such moment in the Indian agricultural transformation. In the pocket of his overcoat lay a kilogram of so of paddy seeds of the variety Taichung Native 1. As expected, the customs denied the permission but on his persuasion that he was bringing them for the minister, they decided to call up Dr. C Subramanian (CS) the then agriculture minister. The Minister’s private secretary picked up and surprisingly confirmed that the scientist was carrying the seeds for the minister. The minister perhaps never knew Chellam Rao whereas his Private Secretary the IAS officer S. Venkitaramanan (later to become RBI governor) while he knew of Rao, he had not asked for the seeds. This accidental entry of these seeds were to seed the Green Revolution. Not that the idea was new, MS Swaminathan had proposed the same a few years before in 1959, yet the Indian bureaucratic and scientific thinking had side-lined these proposals. It was certain fortitude of circumstances aided by two Prime Ministers, first Lal Bahadur Shastri and later Indira Gandhi along with their minister of agriculture C Subramanian that laid the ground for India becoming a power in food production. The transformation from beggar to exporter happened in a mere few years but it was hardly a smooth journey. Therefore, it would be interesting to decode this story of the Indian agricultural transformation.
In a past post, there was a discussion on the Nehruvian thinking on Indian agriculture post-independence. The focus on industrialisation something inspired from the Soviet Union had led to side-lining of agriculture. Agrarian focus was on building irrigation infrastructure than on food production and its inputs like seeds and fertilisers. When Lal Bahadur Shastri took over as the Prime Minister after Nehru, he knew that without a solution to the food problems, there would be no progress. The Nehruvian idea of social transformation through agriculture had run its course. Shastri picked up C Subramanian as his agriculture minister. Subramianan was a protégé of Rajaji who was a strong critic of Nehruvian policy and advocated market led growth that state led industrialization driven growth. The path was not smooth either for the PM or his agricultural minister. There was resistance from both within the party and outside. There was resistance from within the government and outside the government. Hurdles had to be crossed at every stage.
To Subramanian, the first thing was drawing a blue print akin to an industrial project and assessment of viability of inputs, be it seeds, fertilisers, technology as also the pricing incentives to the farmers. Seeds and fertilizers had to be imported accompanied by expansion of public infrastructure necessitating investment here besides the expansion of extension services to help farmer’s secure technical knowledge. There was to be a guarantee of remunerative pricing besides conceptualisation of procurement mechanisms.
TT Krishnamachari (TTK), the finance minister and an industrialist himself criticised the policy on the grounds of price guarantees. Many viewed it to be inflationary and some as benefiting the rich and big farmer as opposed to the small farmer. This point of view still pervades the Indian circles as observed in the recent farmer’s movements against the new legislations deregulating the sector. The Planning Commission member VKRV Rao argued that imports would drain out foreign exchange which itself was precious and scarce. He further opposed setting up of fertiliser plants in the country. There were many who believed a choice of investment in irrigation was preferable to investment in fertilizers and seeds. To whole set of irrigation hawks, they seemed mutually exclusive while in reality they were actually complements.
To quote from Shankar Aiyyar’s book again, there were studies that compared the marginal costs and marginal benefits from both these approaches. The marginal cost to generate one additional tonne of output through investment in irrigation turned out to be Rs. 1400. In contrast, the marginal cost to generate an additional tonne of output was Rs. 400 through investment or import of nitrogenous fertilizers. While it was sound economics, Indian milieu is all about the political battles and their consequent outcomes. To his fortune, Congress leaders like SK Patil or YB Chavan were pro-farmer and favoured his deal while probable opponents like Krishna Menon were out of the government. Yet, there was resistance. The Communists felt it was sell out and opened the doors for American imperialism. There were concerns on over-dependence on MNCs though ironically, it did not bother them that India was literally begging for food every day before the US and other Western countries. To TT, foreign investment would dent the quest for import substitution and self sufficiency despite the irony of begging food in this alleged quest. The political battles were sought to be won through creation of a committee, a typical Indian solution. The committee headed by LK Jha, PMs Secretary virtually endorsed the reforms suggested by CS.
While political battles were raging on, Subramanian who brought in an IAS officer from Orissa B Sivaraman as secretary agriculture. CS held meetings with scientists, bureaucrats and economists. Agricultural universities were set up in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa with the state research centres and departments transferred to these universities. Meanwhile plans were drawn up to assess the introduction of new seeds and farming techniques which led to the next round of the battles CS had to fight. To the scientists, there were doubts about the ability of the farmers to understand the complex modern process. To the economists, it was about conservation of foreign exchange and led them to suggest the use of organic manure instead. The counter was while the use of nitrogenous fertilizers would be to the extent 60-100 kgs per hectare, the equivalent would be tonnes of organic manure given the extent of nitrogenous fertilizers contained in them. There were apprehensions among the bureaucrats about the possible rise in inequalities in the society which incensed CS. His counter was they were present in every field, yet industrialization was encouraged and not agriculture. CS also ensured sufficient budget was available for the experts to tour the country. There were tractors imported from Russia for free in the guise of trials in Rajasthan. American foundations allowed MS Swaminanthan to import around 18000 tonnes of seeds for wheat and paddy. US lent around $50 million to import fertilizers. CS in fact experimented the hybrid seeds in his own garden apparently using his son’s cricket practice pitch as his laboratory. Initial trials by Chellam Rao in Andhra proved to be successful.
There were some one thousand demonstration farms were set up for trials which proved to be a success. Running into these farms, there were many who were sceptical forcing CS at one point to declare the government willingness to reimburse the losses though in the end there was no need to. Meanwhile, states like Madras banned the use of hybrid seeds though the farmers continued to use it. In fact, the ban remained only on paper. While experiments were being rolled out, the clearance for adoption on a large scale continued to be hampered with the Planning Commission setting up roadblocks at every stage. Meanwhile, the conditions in the country had deteriorated. There were two consecutive droughts in 1965 and 1966 with food inflation touching over 20%. The foreign exchange reserves had plummeted to around $500 million. While India was able to get a paltry standby credit from IMF, the larger quantum of credit was withheld pending reforms. IMF was pressurising the government on economic reforms including devaluation of rupee. The Americans were unwilling to lend in absence of a concrete plan to reinvigorate Indian agriculture. Meanwhile Pakistan invaded India in 1965 and the war took a heavy toll. While India came the better of the two thus restoring some national pride after loss of 1962, the conditions continued to be poor. With Lal Bahadur Shastri’s death in Tashkent in 1966 and Indira Gandhi succeeding him, uncertainties continued about India. There were books in the US that projected doomsday scenarios of falling agricultural production, drought, famine and large scale deaths. There were arguments that US should abandon India to its fate given India’s own reluctance to do something to increase agricultural production. The Indian criticism on America’s war in Vietnam further angered President Johnson who had waged his personal prestige in the war. He held back Indian shipments and would be delivered only at the last minute to ensure zero buffer. Indians were literally feeding on ship to mouth basis. A call by PM Indira Gandhi to President Johnson was the final straw. An apparently humiliated Mrs. Gandhi decided enough was enough and gave a go ahead to the Green Revolution. As Aiyyar notes in his book, the window to reap the harvest was about 100 days and the logistics essential to ensure this was mind boggling. As Aiyyar writes hundreds of closed wagons were procured to transport the seeds protecting them from moisture while making possible credit available on large scale for fertilizers and pesticides. The world awaited with bated breath and the results were astonishing. In the season of 1967, 17 million tonnes of wheat were harvested something five million more than the previous record harvest. By 1971, India had hit the harvest of over 100 million tonnes. In the basking of glory of 1971 victory also lay unsung perhaps the story of Indian agriculture.
Indian thinking often morphs into a cognitive entrenchment which makes it difficult to accept the ideas from outside. It was chance encounters that determine the trajectory of fate. In many ways, the path dependency of the events in the mid 1960s led to the emergence of Green Revolution. With passage of time, the externalities have emerged yet these perhaps are outcomes of diminishing returns than the original concept itself. Secondly, given a choice between survival today, and survival in the next fifty years, the inter-temporal choices invariable result into the one for the immediate. Therefore, it was rational for India to adopt the course. What is however interesting, is the Indian policy makes continue to fight a myriad of battles on the same grounds as their predecessors did some fifty odd years ago. The political will is what matters and it is the circumstances that tilt the decisions in one favour or another.
Thoughts on Theory and Practice 